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Abstract
Background: Decentralisation in the health sector has been promoted in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) for 
many years. Inherently, decentralisation grants decision-making space to local level authorities over different functions 
such as: finance, human resources, service organization, and governance. However, there is paucity of studies which have 
assessed the actual use of decision-making space by local government officials within the decentralised health system. 
The objective of this study was to analyse the exercise of decision space across 4 districts in Tanzania and explore why 
variations exist amongst them. 
Methods: The study was guided by the decision space framework and relied on interviews and documentary reviews. 
Interviews were conducted with the national, regional and district level officials; and data were analysed using thematic 
approach. 
Results: Decentralisation has provided moderate decision space on the Community Health Fund (CHF), accounting 
for supplies of medicine, motivation of health workers, additional management techniques and rewarding the formally 
established health committees as a more effective means of community participation and management. While some 
districts innovated within a moderate range of choice, others were unaware of the range of choices they could utilise. 
Leadership skills of key district health managers and local government officials as well as horizontal relationships at 
the district and local levels were the key factors that accounted for the variations in the use of the decision space across 
districts. 
Conclusion: This study concludes that more horizontal sharing of innovations among districts may contribute to more 
effective service delivery in the districts that did not have active leadership. Additionally, the innovations applied by the 
best performing districts should be incorporated in the national guidelines. Furthermore, targeted capacity building 
activities for the district health managers may improve decision-making abilities and in turn improve health system 
performance.
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Implications for policy makers
• District health managers need to work in close collaboration with other district level officials within and outside the health sector.
• Involving key district decision makers, including politicians, to mobilise resources at the district and community levels is critically important 
in effective use of decision-making space. 
• Targeted capacity building activities for district health managers may improve decision-making abilities and ultimately improve health system 
performance.
Implications for the public
The study provides the public with understanding of the factors for the variations in the use of decision-making space in the context of decentralisation.
Key Messages 
Background and Context
Health sector reforms (HSRs) in low- and middle-income 
countries (LMICs) have been the major policy focus over 
the last 4 decades. One of the components of the HSRs is 
decentralisation. Decentralisation is defined as the transfer 
of authority and power to manage, plan and make decisions 
from the central government to agencies and actors at lower 
levels.1-3 Four forms of decentralisation are commonly used 
by scholars; these are deconcentration, delegation, devolution 
and privatisation.1 Whereas deconcentration refers to moving 
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some workload from the central government to subnational 
levels, delegation refers to the transfer of decision-making as 
well as administrative authority for well-defined functions to 
agencies that are not part of the central government; however, 
the central government retains some level of indirect 
control. Devolution, on the other hand, involves creation 
or reinforcement of subnational levels of government that 
undertake a set of functions from the central government. 
These subnational levels have a clear legal status with 
geographically defined boundaries as well as the statutory 
authority to raise revenue and determine its expenditure.1 
Similarly, privatization involves the transfer of functions 
that would otherwise have been performed by the central 
government to organisations it does not own, and which are 
independent and outside the central government.4 
Inherently, decentralisation grants decision-making 
space to local level authorities over different functions 
such as: finance, human resources, service organization, 
access rules and governance.5-8 Besides what is written in 
official documents, the actual exercise of authorities in the 
decentralised contexts may be different from what is stated in 
the policies and thus may vary from one district to another.6-8 
Similarly, decentralised local-level officials may be more or 
less striving to take full advantage of powers officially granted 
to them.9-12 For example, pro-active local officials may use the 
available powers to innovate in order to adapt and improve 
service delivery in their local areas.9-12 Others may continue 
to rely on the centre for direction, resulting in practices that 
largely emulate pre-decentralised relationships of authority.9-12 
A recent systematic review on decentralisation and health 
equity concluded that where decentralisation leads to high 
level of autonomy between regions, disparities in healthcare 
access and financing are more inherent unless mediating 
factors targeted at those inequalities are implemented.13 The 
factors which may result into disparities between regions 
include the capacities of local level authorities to design and 
implement health programmes and the responsiveness of 
health officials to local elected officials.9-11,14-16 
Recent studies in Tanzania reported that decentralisation 
has provided authorities with a range of decision‐making 
space.17,18 However, while district health managers had 
authority in many health systems function areas, limited 
capacity of the local government in financial resources highly 
affected their capacity to make use of the available decision-
making space.19 There is, however, paucity of studies which 
have examined the variations in the use of decision space 
granted by the central government across different districts 
in Tanzania. This study, therefore, not only examines the 
exercise of decision space but also it compares the utilization 
of the granted decision-making space across 4 districts; and 
explores why variations occur between the same.
Decentralisation Reform in Tanzania
Tanzania has been implementing decentralization-by-
devolution (D-by-D) since 1990s.20,21 D-by-D focuses on 
4 main dimensions: political, financial and administrative 
decentralization as well as changed central-local relations.20 
Administrative decentralisation aimed to delink local 
government authorities’ (LGAs’) staff from their respective 
ministries, and grant ability to recruit their own staff and 
establish their own payroll according the needs of each local 
government. Financial decentralisation intended to enable 
district councils to have enough discretional powers to collect 
financial resources through local taxes and other sources of 
revenues as well as to enable local governments to prepare 
their own budgets which reflect their own priorities as well as 
the ability to excise expenditure from the revenue they earn.20 
The changed central-local relations intend to empower LGAs 
in decision-making and that the role of line ministries should 
be on policy-making, supportive and capacity building, 
monitoring and quality assurance. 
Within the current framework of decentralization, the 
Ministry of Health, Community Development, Gender, 
Elderly and Children (MoHCDGEC) is responsible for policy 
development, strategic planning, resource mobilization, and 
monitoring and evaluation. The LGAs are responsible for 
operating and managing primary-level health services, while 
regions supervise LGAs and manage regional hospitals. The 
MoHCDGEC shares regulatory and accountability functions 
with the President’s Office for Regional Administration and 
Local Government (PO-RALG). 
Health sector funding comes from 2 main sources: central 
tax revenue financed by the government of Tanzania general 
tax revenue; and Development Partners’ (DPs’) support.22-24 
DPs provide pooled funding both through general budget 
support (GBS), and the health basket fund (HBF), a form 
of sector budget support. Tanzania depends on a significant 
level of DPs support to finance healthcare, while the share of 
domestic tax sources is still very low.22-24
Methods 
Theoretical Framework
This study was guided by the decision space framework 
which was developed by Thomas Bossert.5 In this study 
4 key functional areas were selected for in-depth analysis 
of the use of the decision-making space namely: health 
financing, human resources for health (HRH), medicine and 
medical supplies, and governance, including community 
participation. These functional areas were selected because 
they have widely been used to assess decision space in the 
context of decentralisation.5-12,14-16 As indicated in Table 1, the 
decision space was determined by assessing the involvement 
of the central and local level authorities in decision-making.
Study Design and Settings 
A descriptive case study design was used.25 The study 
was conducted in 4 districts in Tanzania, namely Iramba 
(Central Tanzania), Kilolo (Southern Highlands), Rombo 
(Northern Tanzania), and Liwale (Southern Tanzania). 
Stratified sampling technique was used to select districts 
for this study. In the first step, 4 out of 8 health zones were 
selected purposively taking into consideration variation in 
geographical representation of the zones. In each zone, one 
district was randomly selected. In each district, one district 
hospital was selected purposively for in-depth analysis of 
the decision-making space. Furthermore, in each district, 2 
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health centres and 2 dispensaries were randomly selected. 
Data Collection Techniques 
The formal range of choices which have been granted to 
the local authorities was assessed through reviewing key 
legislations and previous literature. To explore the use of the 
decision-making space across the 4 districts, we conducted 
in-depth interviews with a range of key informants. At the 
national level, the informants included officials in the Ministry 
of Health and the PO-RALG. At regional and district levels, 
key informants included Regional Health Management Team 
(RHMT) and Council Health Management Team (CHMT) 
members, and health providers. Purposive and snowball 
sampling techniques were used to identify key informants. 
The decision space framework informed the interview 
guides. There was room for probing and delving into topics. 
Interviews were conducted in Kiswahili language by the first 
author (RK) from December 2015 to March 2016. Saturation 
point was reached when no new concepts were identified in 
successive interviews. As indicated in Tables 2 and 3, a total of 
52 interviews were carried out.
Data Management and Analysis
The study used thematic approach to analyse data.26 The 
following steps were followed in the data analysis. First, 
the recorded interviews were transcribed verbatim by the 
first author (RK) and were checked for accuracy by the 
second author (SM). Second, the interview transcripts were 
translated from Kiswahili into English by a professional 
translator and the translations were checked for accuracy by 
the senior researcher (SM). Third, both authors read between 
5 and 10 transcripts to familiarize themselves with the data. 
Forth, the first author (RK) developed a codebook based on 
the objectives of the study and conceptual framework. The 
codebook was shared for review with the senior researcher 
(SM). Fifth, data were coded manually by the first author 
(RK) to the identified codes. New codes that emerged during 
the coding process were added along the way. Saturation was 
achieved when no more codes emerged from the data. Key 
themes were then independently identified and organized by 
level of respondents to facilitate comparisons. Finally, the first 
author (RK) identified representative quotations for each key 
theme and were shared with the second author (SM). 
Results 
This section presents findings on the use of the decision space 
granted by the central government to the local government 
institutions. The findings are organized in terms of the 4 key 
health system functional areas which were assessed in this 
study, namely health financing, HRH, medicine and medical 
supplies and governance, including community participation. 
The findings are compared across the 4 districts of the study. 
Relevant examples on the use of decision space by the district 
health managers, local government officials, and health 
providers have been provided to reinforce the key points. 
Use of Decision Space in Health Financing 
As reported elsewhere, in the framework of decentralisation, 
districts in Tanzania had authority to mobilise and use locally 
generated funds to finance different health-related activities.17 
The Community Health Fund (CHF), the National Health 
Insurance Fund (NHIF) and user fee were the main sources 
of local level revenues in the health sector. CHF is a voluntary 
pre-payment scheme aimed to mobilise financial resources for 
financing health services in rural areas and informal sector and 
was rolled out in 2001.27 A household contributes an annual 
Table 1. Assessment of Decision Space in the Decentralised Health System
Function area
Level of Decision Space 
Narrow Moderate  Wide
Planning/budgeting/allocation of funds
•	 Local involvement in planning
District health managers mainly refer 
to central planning norms/targets
District health managers make some 
local-level adaptations to central planning 
norms/targets
District health managers mainly include 
locally defined strategies and targets
•	 Preparation of regular budget
Budget line items conform mainly to 
central norms
Local revisions made to budget line items 
but most allocative decisions made by 
higher authorities
Local revisions made to budget line 
items with minimal revisions made by 
higher authorities
•	 Allocation and use of funds 
The central government mainly set/
modify/allocate all funds
District health managers set/modify/
allocate some funds 
District health managers mainly set/
modify/allocate funds 
Human resources
•	 Management of human 
resources
All HRM functions handled centrally 
for permanent staff; no ability to 
contract non-permanent staff
Some HRM functions handled locally for 
permanent staff (eg, posting, promotion, 
incentive payment); ability to contract 
some cadres of non-permanent staff
Most/all functions handled locally 
(including salary levels); ability to 
contract most/all cadres of non-
permanent staff
Medicine and medical supplies
All medicine and medical supplies 
procured centrally 
Some medicine and medical supplies 
procured locally
District health managers mainly procure 
medicine and medical supplies 
Governance and community 
participation
All governance functions are 
determined and handled centrally 
Some governance functions are 
determined and handled at the district 
level
Most governance functions are 
determined and handled at the district 
level
Abbreviation: HRM, human resource management. 
Source: Modified from Bossert et al.9 
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payment in order to join CHF membership. The districts 
have been granted authority to define the annual payment 
and manage the funds collected from the households.27 The 
annual contribution paid by the household entitles them to a 
basic package of health services at a primary healthcare facility 
and hospital level in some districts. The funds collected by the 
district are doubled by a “matching grant” from the central 
government. The source of the matching grant is the general 
government revenue. The NHIF is mandatory for public 
servants, with other formal sector employees being able to 
opt into the scheme. User fees in public lower level facilities 
were introduced in 1993 and typically range from TSh 1000 to 
TSh 5000 in public primary health facilities. Total funds from 
CHF, NHIF and user fee revenue are a relatively constant 
and minimal share of the total budget for health available 
to LGAs accounting for around 4% of total expenditure.23 
The subsequent section presents various choices which the 
districts adopted to mobilise and use local resources within 
the decentralised health systems. 
Increasing the Rate of User Fees
Analysis of interviews revealed that in Iramba and Kilolo 
districts, the district health managers in collaboration with 
other stakeholders reviewed the amount of user fees in order 
to attract households to join CHF and discourage out-of-
pocket payment. For example, in Iramba District, the amount 
of user fees increased from TSh 1000 to TSh 3000 and from 
TSh 1500 to TSh 4000 for the dispensary and the health 
centre respectively. At the same time, the annual contribution 
for the CHF was TSh 10 000 per household. Similar finding 
was reported in Kilolo District where user fees in the health 
centres were increased from TShs 2000 to TShs 5000. While 
in Iramba District respondents reported that the idea was 
initiated by the district health managers, and approved by 
the Council Health Services Board (CHSB) and other district 
leaders, in Kilolo District respondents reported that they 
learned this strategy during their official visit to Iramba 
District, which was among the best performers in the CHF 
enrolment in the country.
Involving Other Stakeholders in Mobilizing Communities
In Iramba District, district health managers reported that CHF 
was extensively discussed in various community meetings 
within the district. The district initiated participatory 
sensitisation processes involving various departments and 
stakeholders in the district. Additionally, the district health 
managers managed to secure high support from the district 
officials including the District Commissioner (DC) and 
the District Executive Director (DED). The district health 
managers highlighted the role played by the DC in increasing 
uptake of the CHF as exemplified by a district health manager;
“The major strategy we employed to make CHF a success 
Table 2. District Level Key Informants 
Category of Respondent Roles in the Decentralisation Process
Number of Respondents
Iramba Kilolo Rombo Liwale
CHMT
Health planning and budgeting, and implementers  of health policies, service 
delivery, and health quality assurance in the district
3 3 3 3
DEDs
Policy implementers, employers of HRH in the district, revenue generation and 
decision-makers 
1 1 1 1
District Planning Officer Economic and social planners and policy-makers in the district 1 1 1 1
Health service providers Deliver health services, planning and budgeting at the health facility 4 4 4 4
Total 9 9 9 9
Abbreviations: CHMT, Council Health Management Team; DEDs, district executive directors; HRH, human resources for health.
Table 3. Regional and National Level Key Informants
National and Regional Level Role in the Decentralisation Process Number
Ministry of Health, Community Development 
Gender, Elderly and Children (former MoHSW) 
•	 Policy-making 
•	 Defines priorities for health services
•	 Mobilises resources 
•	 Provides technical guidance to organisations involved in service delivery, 
including districts
•	 Regulates health services delivery
2
PO-RALG (former Prime Minister’s Office for 
Regional Administration and Local Government) 
•	 Oversees the district and regional health services administratively
•	 Supervises planning, reporting and financial accounting 
2
RHMTs
•	 Oversee the work of regional referral hospitals
•	 Provide technical back up to the district councils in planning and 
implementation of health plans and budgets
•	 Interpret policies and guidelines and provide support to the districts in the 
implementation of national policies, guidelines and strategies
12
Total Key Informants 16
Abbreviations: PO-RALG, President’s Office for Regional Administration and Local Government; MoHSW, Ministry of Health and Social Welfare; RHMTs, Regional 
Health Management Teams.
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was to involve politicians. We greatly involved them and 
they responded positively. They did it as though their 
responsibility. And that lessened our duties as professionals. 
This is because politicians know how to play with words” 
(IDI with district health manager, Iramba).
Similarly, a Health Manager in Kilolo District reported that 
they learned this strategy in Iramba District. This significantly 
helped to increase the enrolment of the CHF. The Health 
Manager had this to say; 
“Initially, Iringa Region performed very poorly in terms of 
CHF contribution. We hardly collected 6% of the projected 
collection. Then the Regional Administrative Secretary 
instructed us to go to Iramba District, Singida Region, which 
had reached 70% enrolment. Three of us in the CHMT and 
another one from the office of the Regional Medical Officer 
(RMO) went to Iramba District. We learnt their slogan that 
‘One chick CHF the whole year’. This helped us to design a 
theme through which to mobilize the community to join the 
CHF” (IDI with a district health manager, Kilolo). 
Furthermore, in Liwale District, Health Managers and 
local level respondents reported that involving politicians at 
the district and local levels brought significant improvement 
in the CHF enrolment in the district. One of the Health 
Managers narrated thus:
“We have greatly succeeded to increase the number of 
CHF members after involving politicians from district to 
village levels. For example, last year we emerged the second 
best performer nationwide, and we received a prize from 
the Minister for Health” (IDI with district health manager, 
Liwale).
Expansion of Benefit Package for the Community Health Fund
Interview data indicated that in 3 districts (Kilolo, Rombo, 
and Liwale), the CHF benefits were limited to one primary 
healthcare facility (dispensary or health centre) where the 
households had registered. This was normally the facility 
which was closest to the residence of the member. This, 
according to our respondents, helped making the scheme 
popular. However, in Iramba District, CHF members were 
given wider benefit packages and could get healthcare services 
in any public primary health facility within the district. 
CHF members were also entitled to some secondary-level 
services although they were limited to the outpatient section. 
Respondents reported that expansion of benefit packages 
motivated many households to join CHF scheme in Iramba 
District. 
Limiting the Rate of Exemptions 
All district level respondents and majority of health providers 
reported that the Iramba District managed to convince the 
village councils to pay for the elders and the poor who were 
exempted from paying use fees. According to the CHF policy, 
granting exemptions to the poor and other vulnerable groups 
is within the mandate of the district.6 However, the exemptions 
are not reimbursed by the central government. District level 
respondents reported that, in Iramba District, the elderly 
above 60 years were grouped by 10s to form households and 
were issued with CHF cards. The cards were purchased by 
the village governments. This approach was also applied for 
students in secondary schools. 
This approach was also reported to have been successfully 
used in Liwale District. All district and regional level 
respondents reported that in the last financial year, Liwale 
District was the best performer in the CHF enrolment in 
Lindi Region. The ability of the village government to pay 
for the exempted groups increased the number of CHF 
members thereby enabling the district to get a larger share of 
the matching grant from the central government. The District 
Health Manager elaborated that:
“In our District we have succeeded to accommodate 
vulnerable groups in the CHF. Village governments set 
aside some money from their revenue for that purpose. Low 
income households and vulnerable groups are grouped in 
tens and then given CHF cards which enable them to receive 
health services in health facilities. This has been so great, and 
Liwale is the Best Practise in Lindi Region, and we receive 
good matching fund from the Central Government as a top 
up” (IDI with district health manager, Liwale).
In Iramba District, respondents reported that primary 
school pupils and secondary school students were also grouped 
into 10s and 5s, respectively. Each primary school pupil was 
required to contribute TShs 1000 annually (equivalent to 
US$0.5), and each secondary school student contributed 
TShs 2000 per year (equivalent to US$1). According to our 
respondents, this approach became very attractive to both 
students and parents and it was reported to have contributed 
significantly to the increased uptake of CHF. One of the 
Iramba District Health Managers reported that; 
“In our District, we decided to mobilize pupils and students 
to join the CHF. School children are grouped in tens like ten 
cells and then each receives a CHF card so that they could be 
treated at school. Then a good number of school children and 
parents joined the plan” (IDI with district health manager, 
Iramba). 
In addition, respondents reported that the district health 
managers in collaboration with local government officials 
mobilized individuals in the informal sector like petty traders 
(Machinga) and motorcyclists (Bodaboda dealers). These 
groups were also encouraged to form imaginary households 
of 10s and then joined the CHF. The increased enrolment 
means that the District Council received a larger share from 
the matching funds from the central government.
Use of Decision Space on Drugs and Medical Supplies 
Interviews revealed that the 4 districts studied utilised the 
decision space differently. In Iramba District, the district 
health managers conducted monitoring and auditing of 
medicines and medical supplies in the health facilities. The 
district health managers had realized that the drugs they were 
receiving from the Medical Stores Department (MSD) were 
enough. However, the main problem was mismanagement 
of drugs in the health facilities by health service providers. 
The district health managers had realized that sometimes 
drugs designated to the public health facilities were sold in 
private drug shops. Through frequent auditing, they managed 
to overcome this problem. One of Iramba District Health 
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Managers illustrated it this way:
“Initially, there was mismanagement of medicine. 
Documentation in health facilities was a problem. Health 
service providers did not record medicines neither in ledgers 
nor in dispensing books. We decided to carry out inspection 
in every health facility for drug auditing. We then came to 
realize that there were a lot of problems; personnel issued 
medicine indiscriminately. After that the personnel were more 
careful such that all the supplies received were immediately 
and carefully recorded and issued out with records” (IDI 
with district health manager, Iramba).
Another respondent in Iramba District added that:
“Accountability in the storage of medicine has helped us 
a lot. We made it a plan that whenever we visited health 
facilities, we should visit medical stores; and then see the 
kinds of medicine that go out faster than others. In order for 
us to have enough CHF collection, we have to ensure that 
medicines and medical supplies are constantly available” 
(IDI with district health manager, Iramba).
Respondents reported that frequent drug audit also made it 
possible for the district health managers to identify medicines 
and medical supplies that were not used at the facility. These 
drugs were then sent to other needy health facilities. Health 
service providers were reminded to frequently check their 
ledgers and communicate immediately to the district health 
managers about drugs which were available but not needed 
at their health facility. Another health manager in Iramba 
District put it this way:
“Following the auditing of the medicines in the health 
facilities, it came to our notice that some facilities do have 
medicines which are not needed while the same medicines 
are needed in other facilities. We then instructed that if some 
medicines are not needed in a facility, they should be taken 
to the DMO’s Office so that they can be directed to the needy 
facilities. We were very serious about this and we launched a 
slogan ‘let no medicine expire at your facility; if that happens, 
it is as good as having a pregnant mother die at your facility’” 
(IDI with district health manager, Iramba). 
Likewise, the district health managers in Kilolo District 
reported that they learned the system of drug auditing in 
Iramba District; and then replicated the system to Kilolo 
District. The district health managers reported that following 
this initiative, they had seen significant improvements in the 
availability of medicines in the health facilities. One of the 
District Health Managers reported that:
“We went to Iramba to learn how to audit medicine in 
our health facilities. After the training, we have directed 
all in-charges that medicine prescribed to patients should 
be recorded in ledgers; if a container has 1000 pills, the 
register should also show 1000 pills. Anyone who breaches 
this requirement shall face disciplinary measures. So we have 
succeeded a lot to check irrational use of medicines” (IDI 
with district health manager, Kilolo).
However, district health managers reported that in 
recent years, Iramba District has been facing challenges in 
maintaining the past achievements in various health system 
functioning areas including management of medicine and 
medical supplies as well as sustaining the performance of the 
CHF. This was attributed to the changes in the top management 
of the district health system, particularly the District Medical 
Officer (DMO) and the DC. The former DC was reportedly 
very influential in promoting CHF. Similarly, the former DMO 
was reportedly very instrumental in initiating a number of 
innovations to improve the performance of the district health 
system. One respondent elaborated it this way:
“The present DMO is new, and so the supportive 
supervision we formerly enjoyed is no longer there. We do 
not understand the DMO, and he too does not understand 
us. Quite few of us go out for supervision and there isn’t any 
output since the availability of medicine and medical supply 
is still a problem, although we buy enough. I can see that 
the culture of managing supplies has gone down” (IDI with 
district health manager, Iramba).
Use of Decision Space in Human Resources for Health
Within the decentralisation framework, district councils 
have decision space in the areas of motivation, promotion, 
and retention of health workers.18 The analysis of district 
health plans and interviews with the district health managers 
and health service providers revealed that all districts had 
developed some mechanisms of providing incentives to 
health providers in order to improve their performance. 
These incentives included paying subsistence allowances for 
the newly recruited employees, and giving extra duty and 
on-call allowances to health service providers when working 
in extra hours. Other health workers’ retention mechanisms 
included providing housing to health service providers. 
This was reported to be widely practiced in all the 4 districts 
involved in this study. 
However, further analysis of the interviews with the district 
health managers and health service providers revealed 
significant variations in the use of the decision space with 
regard to motivation across the 4 districts. For instance, 
in Iramba District, there was a well-defined schedule of 
providing extra duty and on-call allowances to health service 
providers contrary to the other 3 districts. Although district 
health managers in Liwale and Rombo districts reported 
that extra duty and on-call allowances were paid to health 
service providers, interviews with health service providers 
refuted this claim, adding that it used to be the practice in 
the past. Respondents reported that in the past they used to 
receive these allowances but presently they have disappeared 
completely.
“Formerly we enjoyed different motivation packages like 
extra duty and on-call allowances. But that has now stopped; 
although we still fill in claim forms, we do not know if we 
shall be paid, and when the payments will be due” (IDI with 
health provider, Rombo district).
A health service provider in Liwale had a similar view as he 
added that;
“Formerly we were motivated. For example, when we went 
out to villages for outreach services, we were paid. That also 
applied to night and extra hours. But nowadays these things 
have remained a story” (IDI with health provider, Liwale).
In Iramba District, extra duty allowances were consistently 
paid to health service providers on a monthly basis. All district 
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health managers reported that all health service providers 
were constantly paid allowances when they worked for extra 
hours. This was also confirmed during interviews with health 
service providers. One respondent pointed out this way:
“We receive extra duty and on-call allowances. Although 
sometimes payments are delayed, we at least get paid” (IDI 
with health provider, Iramba).
Connected to the above, it was also found that when health 
providers sent monthly reports to the DMO’s office, they were 
reimbursed transport costs and paid per diem for at least 
one night. The district level respondents and health service 
providers reported that this approach significantly motivated 
health service providers and lead to timely reporting of the 
information. A health Manager in Iramba reported that;
“In our District, if the staff bring monthly reports we give 
them fare and one per diem. That motivates them to bring 
the reports every month” (IDI with district health manager, 
Iramba).
When asked whether they were receiving any allowances, 
one of the health providers pointed out this way: 
“We are motivated. For instance, if we do extra duties 
we receive extra duty allowances and we also receive on-
call allowances; although relatively little, at least we get it. 
Similarly, if an employee takes monthly reports to the District 
Headquarters, he/she does not use his/her own money; the 
Council covers that” (IDI with health provider, Iramba 
district). 
A number of initiatives to motivate health service 
providers were also reported in Kilolo District. District 
level respondents reported that in order to improve health 
workers’ performance and retention, the district health 
managers designed a number of incentives. First, the District 
Council through the District Health Department established 
mechanisms of rewarding health service providers in very 
remote and hard to reach health facilities. In those facilities, 
each healthcare provider was given a token allowance of 
Tshs 100 000 per year. Secondly, the district health managers 
provided incentive of Tshs 100 000 to health facilities which 
were able to collect, compile and timely submit to the district 
health managers accurate and complete health information 
reports. Similarly, the same amount of money was awarded to 
the health facilities which scored best in the environmental and 
cleanliness competitions. These awards and incentives were 
normally provided during the workers’ annual celebrations, 
normally held on 1 May each year. A Health Manager from 
Kilolo District had this to say;
“In our Council, we decided to motivate those who work in 
remote health facilities, which we called ‘hard to reach areas’. 
For every remote facility, we used to pay Ths. 100 000/= to 
every employee. But also for the best performing facilities 
in terms of CHF collection and hard environment we paid 
Tshs. 100 000/= to each. Also in this year’s budget we shall 
give motorcycles to five (5) villages as motivation for their 
last year’s performance” (IDI with district health manager, 
Kilolo).
A Health manager in the same district added that; 
“In general, in retention mechanism we used to perform 
well because initially we had a rich reserve of personnel. 
Currently, 70% of our health facilities have clinicians, and 
quite few of them fall short. And it is not actually that they are 
without clinicians; only that they on study leaves. However, 
if you may have access to the number of employees based 
on the new 2014–2019 requirement, of course the shortage 
seems alarming” (IDI with district health manager, Kilolo).
According to the district health managers, due to the 
implementation of these initiatives, in 2015 the NHIF awarded 
Kilolo District a certificate of recognition as one of the best 
performing districts in human resources management practice 
in Tanzania. During field work, the first author managed to 
see the certificate displayed in the DMO’s Office. 
In Liwale District, health managers reported that every 
year they provided incentive to 3 health service providers 
who were performing extra ordinarily in health facilities. One 
health provider was chosen from the hospital, one from health 
centres and one from dispensaries. Like in Kilolo District, the 
awards were provided during annual workers’ celebrations 
held on 1 May each year. A heath manager in Liwale District 
responded this way:
“The first motivation is for the best workers. We have 
three winners every year who receive some little packages. 
Best workers are drawn from the District Hospital, Health 
Centres and our dispensaries” (IDI with district health 
manager, Liwale).
In addition, all district level respondents in Liwale District 
reported that all newly recruited staff employed at the district 
hospital were given free accommodation until when they 
were able to rent houses. This was done in order to attract 
newly recruited staff and promote retention. During field 
work, the researcher managed to see some of the houses at the 
district hospital which were reserved for the newly recruited 
staff. However, it was evident the houses were more suitable 
for the employees who had no families. 
Use of Decision Space in the Governance of the District 
Health System
The analysis of interviews with all district and regional 
level respondents revealed that in all the 4 districts, health 
facility governing committees (HFGCs) and CHSBs 
existed. This implies that there were mechanisms for 
community participation and governance of the district 
health services within the framework of decentralisation. 
Respondents revealed that within the current framework of 
decentralisation, each council is required to allocate fund in 
their annual budgets to facilitate the activities of the boards 
and committees. 
However, further analysis of the interviews revealed 
differences across the 4 districts in terms of the functioning 
and effectiveness of the committees. While in all the 4 
districts health committees faced different challenges which 
affected their performance, it was evident that in Iramba 
District, the committees were perceived to perform relatively 
better compared to Kilolo, Liwale, and Rombo districts. It is 
thus important to understand the kind of innovations which 
Iramba District adopted to make these committees perform 
relatively better. The district respondents and health service 
providers in Iramba District reported that the district health 
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managers conducted monthly review of HFGCs. The Ministry 
of Health’s guideline requires that HFGCs meet quarterly.26 
However, in Iramba the HFGCs met monthly. The additional 
meetings were held at the discretion of the District Council. 
One of health managers in Iramba District elaborated that;
“In our district, these committees meet monthly. Although 
the guidelines on their institution prescribe meeting quarterly, 
we decided that they meet monthly so that they have enough 
time to oversee and supervise service provision in our health 
facilities. We deliberately did this to enable these committees 
to supervise CHF and medicines in our” (IDI with district 
health manager, Iramba).
Another respondent added that;
“You know these committees comprise villagers from 
different areas from the location of the facility. The 
committees do a great deal in supervising the operation of 
the facilities. For that matter, we decided that they should 
meet more often, including once or twice a month, although 
the guideline suggests they should meet four times in a year” 
(Health Worker in Iramba).
Interview data revealed that in all the 4 districts, there was a 
system of motivating their health committees. The committee 
members were paid a token allowance during their meetings. 
The allowances in most of the districts ranged from Tshs 
2000 (equivalent to 1$) to Tshs 10 000 (equivalent to 5$). The 
findings, however, indicated some variations in the 4 districts; 
while in Iramba District, allowances were consistently paid 
after every meeting, in Liwale, Kilolo, and Rombo districts 
members of the committee reported that in most cases, the 
payment was delayed until the next meeting. In addition, in 
some cases they were not paid anything. District respondents, 
health service providers and members of the committees 
reported that this largely affected the morale of the committee 
members. A health committee member in Rombo District 
reported that; 
“As members of Dispensary Committee, we face a lot of 
challenges. We often come to the Dispensary for different 
duties. We often spend the whole day here, only to receive 
nothing in return. We spend our own money and no one 
refunds us” (IDI with health committee member, Rombo 
District).
Another respondent in Liwale District narrated this way:
“We face a lot of challenges, one of which being lack of 
any compensation as we attend meetings. For instance, a 
committee member could come from far away to attend a 
meeting and does not receive any payment” (IDI with health 
committee member, Liwale).
Why Variations in the Use of Decision Space?
This section analyses factors that accounted for the variations 
in the actual exercise of decision space across the 4 study 
districts. The key themes that emerged from the analysis of 
interviews are: skills, knowledge and experience of the district 
health managers, personalities of the top leaders and support 
from DPs. 
Skills and Knowledge of District Health Managers 
Looking at the qualifications, most of the district health 
managers had bachelor degrees and some had advanced 
diploma. In addition, as indicated in Table 4, there were no 
significant differences in the experiences of the district health 
managers across the 4 study districts.
Leadership Skills of the Top Leaders
The relatively better performance of Iramba District was 
attributed to the personalities of the top leaders at the regional 
and district level. The DED and the DC were reported to be 
very influential in promoting CHF. Similarly, the former RMO 
and DMO were reportedly very instrumental in initiating a 
number of innovations to improve the performance of the 
district health system as elaborated by one respondent: 
“Some time back until 2016 we had no serious problems. 
But towards the end of 2016 to date, we have almost failed. 
A lot of changes have taken place. The present DMO is new 
and we do not really understand him. Therefore, even the 
follow up is now very minimal. We do not understand the 
DMO, and he too does not understand us. Quite few of us 
go out for supervision and there isn’t any output since the 
availability of medicine and medical supply is now beginning 
to be a problem again, although we buy enough. I can see 
that the culture of managing supplies has gone down” (IDI 
with district health manager, Iramba).
The district health managers underlined the role played 
by the DC in increasing the CHF uptake. According to our 
Table 4. Qualifications and Experiences of the District Health Managers
District Respondent Age Years of Experience Qualifications
Liwale
1 36 7 Bachelor of Arts
2 55 27 Advanced Diploma - Paediatrics
3 44 44 Bachelor of Medicine 
Kilolo
1 58 36 Advanced Diploma - Public health 
2 31 6 Bachelor of Arts
3 44 7 Bachelor of Pharmacy
Iramba
1 41 14 Bachelor of Medicine
2 42 20 Advanced Diploma (Mid wifery)
3 34 5 Advanced Diploma (Paediatrics)
Rombo
1 34 3 Bachelor of Nursing
2 27 3 Bachelor of Arts
3 36 2 Bachelor of Pharmacy
Source: Field data, 2017.
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respondents, the DC designed a slogan famously known in 
Kiswahili as Kuku mmoja CHF mwaka mzima kwa kaya, 
literally meaning “one chick enables a family to pay CHF 
premium for the whole year.” This slogan encouraged 
household members to keep chicken that would enable 
them to pay CHF premium annually as explained by one 
respondent;
“The DC used to help us a lot in community meetings 
because the public tends to trust them more than they trust 
us. The DC had a famous slogan ‘one chick CHF the whole 
year’. This was very supportive” (IDI with district health 
manager, Iramba).
Support From Development Partners 
In Iramba Districts, respondents highlighted the role played by 
the World Vision in strengthening leadership and managerial 
capacity of the regional and district health managers. The 
capacity strengthening activities were implemented under the 
project named “Supporting Systems to Improve Nutrition, 
Maternal New-born and Child Health” (SUSTAIN-MNCH) 
– a 3-year project funded by the Canadian Government’s 
Department of Foreign Trade and Development. Among the 
key system strengthening activities were: training district 
and regional health managers on planning and budgeting; 
mentoring of the regional and district health managers 
on leadership, governance, and supportive supervision; 
and training and mentoring of regional and district health 
managers on data entry, validation and analysis using 
the electronic district health information system software 
health.
According to our respondents, the teams which received 
training have continued to provide support to other members 
who had not received the training from the SUSTAIN 
project. The CHMT members were of the opinion that the 
training on planning and budgeting helped increase the 
capacity of the district and regional health managers and 
subsequently improve the quality of the district annual health 
plans. According to our respondent, district annual plans 
for Singida Region had improved significantly compared to 
district annual health plans from other districts in Tanzania. 
It is not surprising that Singida Region received prize from 
the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MoHSW) during 
the 2013/2014 and 2015/2016 financial year because of high 
quality of the district annual health plans. The first author 
(RK) managed to see numerous certificates of outstanding 
awards displayed in Iramba and at the regional health 
management offices.
Discussion 
The findings of this study revealed that within the decentralised 
health systems in Tanzania, some districts were able to make 
use of the range of choices they were formally granted by the 
central government while others were unaware of the range 
of choices they could utilise. In some cases, district health 
managers and local government officials made effective 
use of the decision space more than the formal authorities 
stipulated in the policies. For example, the findings indicated 
that there were variations on the performance of the CHF 
between Iramba and other districts. The findings also showed 
variations in the performance of the health committees and 
boards. Our findings indicated that while in all the 4 districts 
health committees were not functioning optimally, in Iramba 
District, the health committees performed relatively better 
than in the other districts. It was also evident that there 
were variations in the performance of the districts on the 
management of medicines and medical supplies. Furthermore, 
in the area of HRH management, a number of initiatives were 
adopted, although there were variations across the districts of 
the study. For example, the Iramba District health managers 
introduced the system of providing incentives to health 
service providers upon submission of monthly reports to the 
districts. In addition to improving the motivation of health 
service providers, the initiative was reported to have increased 
the rate of reporting from health facilities. Like in other areas 
of the health system performance, other districts in Tanzania, 
including Kilolo learned good practices from Iramba District 
and replicated in their districts thereby improving both 
the motivation of health service providers and the rate of 
reporting from health facilities. 
These findings confirm earlier studies on decentralisation 
and decision space from other settings which have 
demonstrated that decentralisation provides a wide range 
of choice within the formal decision space that is likely to 
have impacts on the effectiveness of the implementation 
of decentralisation.11,12,14-18 However, the decentralised 
local-level officials may be more or less striving to take full 
advantage of powers officially conferred to them.14-18 Pro-
active local officials may use the available powers to innovate 
in order to adapt and improve service delivery in their local 
areas.14-18 Others may continue to rely on the centre for 
direction, resulting in practices that largely emulate pre-
decentralised relationships of authority.14-18 This implies 
that the performance of the decentralised local government 
officials in improving services delivery depends, among other 
things, on the activeness of the top-leaders at the district and 
local levels. The theoretical advantages claimed by advocates 
of the decentralisation reform are not automatically realised 
at the district and local levels. As Bossert noted it clearly, if 
local-level officials do not make use of the available decision-
making space in their local situations, decentralisation may 
not automatically achieve the theoretical advantages claimed 
by advocates of the reform.17
The disparities between districts revealed in this study are 
predictable and this is acceptable in the decentralised health 
systems as long as the overall gains are higher than under the 
centralised system. Studies in both low-income and high-
income countries have revealed that decentralisation improves 
the ability of decentralised sub-national levels to address the 
health needs and preferences of the local population. This 
inherently results to disparities between jurisdictions in terms 
of their focus and objectives and may lead into inequities.13,28 
In order to prevent inequities, it is important for the central 
coordination to define health system goals and outline the 
broad frameworks. Equally important, in the decentralised 
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health systems, there is need for mechanisms to redistribute 
financial resources to mitigate disparity in financing healthcare 
between districts. The most common mechanisms include a 
population or need based financial resource transfers and 
cross subsidisation or equalisation schemes.29,30 
While the capacities of the decentralised health system 
managers in terms of human resources and finances have 
been reported to influence the use of decision-making space 
in the districts,15-17,20 this study underlines the importance of 
leadership skills and managerial capabilities of the key district 
health managers and local government officials. While all 
districts depended financially on the central government and 
had almost similar levels of human resources and financial 
capacities, it was the personal initiatives of the key district and 
regional level managers which contributed to the significant 
variations in the utilization of the available decision space in 
the districts. This finding is consistent with the recent studies 
in Tanzania. For example, Maluka and Bukagile31 reported 
that the personal initiatives of the district level officials 
contributed significantly in the variations in the uptake 
of the CHF. Similar findings were reported by Joseph and 
Maluka in a study on leadership and management practices 
and their influence on the performance of the CHF in 
Tanzania.32 Another study also attributed the variation in the 
performance of the HFGCs to the efforts and initiatives of the 
top-district level leaders.33 Furthermore, another study done 
in Indonesia on decentralization and performance of district 
health systems also highlighted the importance of personal 
initiatives of the key district health leaders in getting things 
done.34
The findings of our study suggest that targeted capacity 
building activities at the district level may improve the 
decision-making abilities of the decentralized officials and 
ultimately improve health system performance. The key 
capacity strengthening skills which can be important include: 
management and leadership, supportive supervision, and 
planning and budgeting. Studies elsewhere have reported 
that institutional capacity building significantly improved the 
performance of the decentralized health systems.14,15,35
Furthermore, our findings underline the importance 
of horizontal relationships in the decentralized health 
systems. The district health managers need to work in close 
collaboration with other district level officials within and 
outside the health sector. Studies have indicated that the 
autonomy of any organization depends on the network of 
relationships at the horizontal level.36,37 Therefore, the ability 
of the decentralized health system organization, in this case, 
district health management, to utilise the available decision 
space may be facilitated or hindered by what is possible in 
their specific local context.36,37
Limitations 
This study adopted qualitative comparative case study 
design relying primarily on the in-depth interviews with 
key informants and analysis of key policy documents. While 
efforts were made to sample respondents from different levels 
of decision-making within the framework of decentralised 
healthcare system in Tanzania, the results of the study are not 
generalizable to other districts in Tanzania. While the study 
was conducted in 4 different districts, representing different 
health zones in Tanzania, the findings presented perspectives 
of a relatively small number of respondents. However, the in-
depth and rich description presented in this thesis provides a 
valuable contribution to knowledge base on decentralisation, 
decision space in the context of LMICs. The paper sheds light 
on how district and local level officials were able or not able 
to utilize the available decision space to improve the delivery 
of health services.
Conclusion 
This study concludes that decentralisation inherently creates 
disparity between different districts in terms of their focus 
and objectives. Those districts with pro-active managers 
benefit more from local autonomy than districts with less 
pro-active managers. More horizontal sharing of innovations 
among districts may contribute to more effective service 
delivery in the districts that did not have active leadership. 
The innovations applied by the excelling district should be 
incorporated in the national guidelines. Additionally, targeted 
capacity building activities for the district health managers 
may improve decision-making abilities and, in turn, improve 
health system performance. Furthermore, there is a need to 
forge sustainable partnerships with other key actors in the 
district. In particular, district health managers need to work 
in close collaboration with other district level officials within 
and outside the health sector.
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